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Abstract—We are concerned with an appropriate mathematical
measure of resilience in the face of targeted node attacks for
arbitrary degree networks, and subsequently comparing the re-
silience of different scale-free network models with the proposed
measure. We strongly motivate our resilience measure termed
vertex attack tolerance (VAT), which is denoted mathematically
as τ(G) = minS⊂V |S||V−S−Cmax(V−S)|+1 , where Cmax(V −S) is
the largest connected component in V −S. We attempt a thorough
comparison of VAT with several existing resilience notions:
conductance, vertex expansion, integrity, toughness, tenacity and
scattering number. Our comparisons indicate that for artbitrary
degree distributions VAT is the only measure that fully captures
both the major bottlenecks of a network and the resulting
component size distribution upon targeted node attacks (both
captured in a manner proportional to the size of the attack set).
For the case of d-regular graphs, we prove that τ(G) ≤ dΦ(G),
where Φ(G) is the conductance of the graph G. Conductance
and expansion are well-studied measures of robustness and
bottlenecks in the case of regular graphs but fail to capture
resilience in the case of highly heterogeneous degree graphs.
Regarding comparison of different scale-free graph models, our
experimental results indicate that PLOD graphs with degree
distributions identical to BA graphs of the same size exhibit
consistently better vertex attack tolerance than the BA type
graphs, although both graph types appear asymptotically resilient
for BA generative parameter m = 2. BA graphs with m = 1 also
appear to lack resilience, not only exhibiting very low VAT values,
but also great transparency in the identification of the vulnerable
node sets, namely the hubs, consistent with well known previous
work.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
While networks arise ubiquitously from countless and var-
ied disciplines, an important problem relevant to all types
of networks is that of measuring and generating resilience
characteristics. Although the definition of what constitutes a
resilient network may differ across domains (particularly if the
network’s nodes and edges have various attributes associated
with them), the topological properties characterizing resilience
may be fairly stable across divergent domains and may depend
only on the network’s graph theoretic representation. At a
minimum, any notion of resilience must express the relative
size of a most critical set of target edges or target vertices
whose removal (upon an attack) would be detrimental to the
remaining network and attempt to quantify the amount of
damage that is done. The graph-theoretic network resilience
problem in its utmost generality is not new. But, the most stud-
ied theoretical machinery to discuss it, namely conductance[5]
(and the related expansion [3]), is more meaningful for
networks with homogeneous degree distributions because it
is a fundamentally edge-based notion. However, there is a
growing body of work [20] indicating that many real world
networks, ranging from biological networks to online social
networks, often exhibit heterogeneous and scale-free degree
distributions. Even in situations where the scale-free nature of
a degree distribution may be questioned [8], an assumption
of degree homogeneity would be even more suspect in many
networks [2]. Some notable exceptions to this are, of course,
networks whose connection are purely defined by distances in
low dimensional space (such as random ad-hoc networks) as
well as networks that have very hard and frugal constraints
on the number of connections their nodes are allowed. In any
case, there is a gap between much of the beautiful existing
graph theoretical machinery to analyze resilience in networks
based on conductance and the actual resilience, particularly
against node attacks in many actual networks, which have
heterogeneous degrees.
It is important to note, of course, that conductance (in its
various normalized and non-normalized forms) is a funda-
mental property of graphs independent of its applicability to
edge-based resilience or resilience in general. Conductance is
intimately related to both the mixing times of random walks
on graphs [22] and the eigenvalues of the graph’s adjacency
matrix (or normalized adjacency matrix as befits the situation)
[5]. Therefore, one very important application of conductance
has involved the analysis of randomized algorithms, particu-
larly for hard counting problems, yielding an important place
for the measure in theoretical computer science. Many of
the Markov chains considered in such contexts are regular
or almost-regular, and it is relatively recently that the het-
erogeneity of many actual networks has become established
across many fields, the relevance of such degree distributions
first being established not by theoretical computer scientists
but by network scientists in any case.
To illustrate why degree heterogeneity poses such a problem
in the application of conductance (conveniently approximable
via eigenvalues) to resilience, we first remind the reader
of the famous work [1] claiming the vulnerability of the
internet to targeted attacks and the equally famous response
[8] and extension [2] questioning the assumptions of the model
considered. An observer may then conclude that although the
Barabasi-Albert model (and preferential attachment in general)
may tend to induce a small target set of critical nodes whose
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2removal severely disconnects the graph, there may be other
generative models of scale-free networks that are significantly
more resilient (against node attacks). Particularly, an observer
familiar with the conductance benefits of completely random
edge choices for homogeneous degree networks [13], [12],
[3] may even be tempted to claim that a generative model
in which edges are randomly chosen conditional upon the
constraint of a pre-specified power-law degree distribution
(such as the PLOD model [21] ) should be more resilient than
the preferential attachment model. Yet, if one were to take
conductance as the measure of resilience against node attacks,
then one would observe a precisely contradicting response:
In fact, the conductance of scale-free graphs generated via
preferential attachment (which we shall refer to as BA graphs
henceforth) is optimal [19] while the conductance of random
scale-free graphs is sub-optimal [14] (especially relative to BA
graphs) though still fairly good. Clearly, conductance does not
capture resilience against node attacks.
In this work, we are motivated by the search for both (i)
a measure that does capture resilience against node attacks
in a meaningful way, as well (ii) the actual comparative
resilience of different generative scale-free models. As such,
this work is composed of two logical modules. In the first
module, we propose and strongly motivate our resilience
measure which we call vertex attack tolerance denoted by
mathematically by τ(G) and shortened VAT. Our measure
was first introduced by the authors in preliminary work [9],
wherein some examples were used to compare and contrast
the measure with conductance. We note that in this work, we
slightly modify the measure to smooth it by adding one to the
denominator. But, more importantly, we attempt a thorough
comparison of vertex attack tolerance with several existing
node-based resilience notions found via a thorough graph
theory literature survey. In particular, we compare and contrast
VAT with the following previously known graph-theoretic
notions of resilience: edge-based conductance[22], [5], vertex
expansion[17], [11], integrity[4], toughness[6], tenacity[18]
and scattering number[15]. While some such measures appear
surprisingly similar in nominal form to vertex attack tolerance,
we show that VAT captures resilience in a strictly more
meaningful way. Furthermore, we mathematically relate τ(G)
to edge conductance by appropriate lower and upper bounds
in the case of regular graphs, which is a case in which con-
ductance is known to be meaningful. One advantage of such
relationships in the case of regular graphs is that eigenvalue
bounds follow as corollaries as well. We also present other
bounds on VAT with respect to other measures in special cases.
However, we demonstrate and maintain that vertex attack
tolerance is a strictly more appropriate resilience measure for
both homogeneous and heterogeneous degree graphs in the
context of node failures.
The second logical module of our paper then consists
of extensive calculations of τ(G) for important generative
models of scale-free graphs: preferential attachment graphs
captured via the BA model, random scale-free graphs captured
via the PLOD model, and heuristically-optimized trade-offs
graphs referred to as the HOTNet model[10]. Due to the
inherent intractability (i.e. NP-completeness and in some cases
approximation-hardness) of many aforementioned resilience
notions, as well as the plausibly more difficult combinatorial
form that vertex attack tolerance takes, an efficient exact
algorithm to compute it is unlikely. Therefore, we have only
been able to exactly compute τ(G) of networks considered for
sizes up to 40 nodes via a branch-and-bound approach. Beyond
that size and up to 2500 nodes, we used genetic algorithms
and local search methods to calculate as accurately as feasible
the vertex attack tolerances. The methods themselves, and
how they were optimized to converge more quickly, are of
algorithmic interest in their own right. Of course, the exact
settings of the parameters greatly alters the graph structure,
and one advantage of the PLOD model in that respect is
that the degree distribution may be generated by any other
model a priori. Unfortunately, HOTNets, which exhibited the
worst vertex attack tolerance on the various parameter settings
considered even when controlling for average degree, cannot
be tweaked to follow an exact degree distribution as such.
Furthermore, for small graph sizes, BA graphs exhibit better
vertex attack tolerance than both PLOD and HOTNet models.
However it is the asymptotic behavior of a graph family that
is statistically relevant. Our results indicate that PLOD graphs
with degree distributions identical to (i.e. with degree distri-
butions generated from) BA graphs of the same size exhibit
increasingly better vertex attack tolerance than the BA type
graphs, although both graph types appear surprisingly resilient
when the generatize BA parameter is m = 2. In particular, the
VAT values diminish very slowly despite repeated doubling of
graph sizes. We also discovered the following in the process of
our simulations: Finding bad attack sets (sets of nodes whose
removal causes great disruption according to the VAT measure)
were extremely difficult to find for BA graphs. This leads
to our current questions regarding resilience with respect to
specific attack and failure models.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
We define vertex attack tolerance (VAT) as
τ(G) = min
S⊂V
{ |S||V − S − Cmax(V − S)|+ 1}
where Cmax(V −S) is the largest connected component in V −
S. We note that this is a smoothened version of the measure
of vertex attack tolerance previously introduced by the authors
in [9]. It will also be convenient to refer to this unsmoothened
version of vertex attack tolerance, which we denote as follows:
τˆ(G) = min
S⊂V
{ |S||V − S − Cmax(V − S)| }
Combinatorial conductance or edge based conductance is
defined as
Φ(G) = minS⊂V,V ol(S)≤V ol(V )/2{ |Cut(S,V−S)|V ol|S| }
= minS⊂V,V ol(S)≤V ol(V )/2{ |Cut(S,V−S)|δS |S| }
3where |Cut(S, V −S)| is the size of the cut separating S from
V −S, V ol(S) is the sum of the degrees of vertices in S, and
δS is the average degree of vertices in S. Vertex expansion is
defined as
V (G) = min
S⊂V
{n |N(S)||S||V − S| }
where N(S) denotes the outer boundary of S, namely N(S) =
{i ∈ V − S | ∃u ∈ S,3 {u, v} ∈ E}. Integrity is defined as
I(G) = min
S⊂V
{|S|+ Cmax(V − S)}
Toughness is defined as
t(G) = min
S⊂V
{ |S|
ω(V − S)
}
where ω(V − S) is the number of connected components in
V-S. Tenacity is defined as
T (G) = min
S⊂V
{ |S|+ Cmax(V − S)
ω(V − S)
}
Scattering number is defined as
sn(G) = max
S⊂V
{ω(V − S) + |S|} (1)
However, as higher scattering numbers corresponds to worse
resilience, it will be more convenient to discuss the smoothed
inverted version of scattering, which we denote
h(G) = 1sn(G)+1 = minS⊂V
{ 1
ω(V − S) + |S|+ 1}
It is clear that all above notions are defined based on
finding some worst case target set of nodes. Therefore, it
will be convenient to directly denote the referenced target set
as well as the measure defined conditional upon a particular
target set. For the case of vertex attack tolerance, we denote
set-vertex tolerance as
τS(G) =
|S|
|V − S − Cmax(V − S)|+ 1
so that clearly τ(G) = minS⊂V τS(G) and correspondingly
S(τ(G)) = argminS⊂V τS(G)
Similary for set-conductance:
ΦS(G) =
|Cut(S, V − S)|
δS |S|
so that clearly Φ(G) = minS⊂V,|V ol(S)|≤|V ol(V )|/2 ΦS(G) and
correspondingly
S(Φ(G)) = argminS⊂V,|V ol(S)|≤|V ol(V )|/2τS(G)
For set vertex expansion:
VS (G) = n
|N(S)|
|S||V − S|
so that V (G) = minS⊂V VS (G) and
S(V (G)) = argminS⊂V VS (G)
The pattern is clear for set integrity, set toughness, set tenacity,
and smoothed inverse scattering number, respectively denoted
IS(G), tS(G), TS(G), and hS(G). For all such set resilience
measures fS , we may generally denote the target set function
as S(f(G)) = argminfS(G).
It will be convenient to denote the subgraph of a graph G =
(V,E) that is induced by a vertex set S ⊂ V as GS = (S,ES).
Finally, there is a special infinite family of graphs which
we shall refer to in comparing resilience notions, namely the
star graphs denoted Star(n) and defined as follows:
Definition II.1 The star graph Star(n) is an undirected graph
G = (V,E) on n = |V | nodes with a unique designated
central node q such that node q is connected to every other
node u ∈ V −{q}, and there are no other edges between any
other pair of nodes. Namely, E = {{q, u} | u ∈ V − {q}}.
When the labeling of the graph is arbitrary, we may without
loss of generality assume that q = 1.
III. THEORETICAL RESULTS
As stated, conductance is arguably the most important
and well-studied resilience notion in the context of d-regular
graphs. A main result of this section is the following theorem
which states essentially, for any d-regular graph that does not
exhibit too-high conductance, the vertex attack tolerance of
the same graph cannot exceed the conductance by more than
a factor of d:
Theorem III.1 Given a connected, undirected d-regular
graph G = (V,E), let set S = S(Φ(G)) such that the
induced subgraph GS is connected. If Φ(G) ≤ 1d2 then
τ(G) < dΦ(G).
In proving Theorem III.1 we shall use the following lemma
regarding conductance in d-regular graphs:
Lemma III.2 Given a connected, undirected d-regular graph
G = (V,E), there exists a set S such that S = S(Φ(G)) and
the induced subgraph GS is connected.
Before presenting the proof of Theorem III.1 relating VAT
via conductance in the case of d-regular graphs, we emphasize
that conductance does not capture node-based resilience in
the case of heterogeneous degree graphs to any meaningful
approximation factor. We have motivated this comparison and
contrast in previous work [9] via example graphs, including
the graph Star(10), and in fact this discrepancy is a major
motivation of this work itself. However, here we wish to
generalize and formalize this point theoretically, as we do in
the next theorem:
Theorem III.3 There exists an infinite graph family, namely
the star graphs Star(n) such that a targeted attack against the
central node results in a maximal disconnection of the graph
4into n − 1 isolated nodes. Yet, the following are the conduc-
tance and vertex attack tolerance of Star(n) respectively, for
n ≥ 3:
1) Φ(Star(n)) = 1
2) τ(Star(n)) = 1n−1
In other words, there is an infinite graph family which is
maximally intolerant against a targeted node attack. The
conductance of this family is maximal, whereas the vertex
attack tolerance of this family is minimal, amongst all possible
graphs.
In proving the above theorem, we will also make use of
the following Lemma that characterizes minimal vertex attack
tolerance of any graph:
Lemma III.4 For any connected, undirected graph G =
(V,E) on n = |V | ≥ 3 nodes, τ(G) ≥ 1n−1
Now we demonstrate the proofs of Theorems III.3 and III.1,
and Lemmas III.4 and III.2, respectively:
Proof of Theorem III.3: Let q be the designated central
node in Star(n). First, let us bound Φ(Star(n)): Let S =
S(Φ(Star(n))). First consider the case that q 3 S. In that
case, all degrees of nodes in S are one, and each node in S is
adjacent only to q which is not in S. Therefore, |Cut(S, V −
S)| = |S| = |V ol(S)|, proving that Φ(Star(n)) = 1 for
this case. In the other case that q 3 S, note that the volume
constraint in the definition of conductance restricts us to sets S
that do not exceed half of the total volume of V . The volume
of q alone is proportional to its degree n−1, whereas there are
exactly n−1 other nodes whose total volume is exactly n−1.
Therefore, in the case that q ∈ S, it must be that S = {q}
alone. In this situation, Cut(S, V −S) is exactly all the n−1
edges of G, and so calculating for conductance again yields
ΦS(Star(n)) =
n−1
n−1 = 1.
Now we consider τ(Star(n)). As intuitively clear, first
consider τS(Star(n)) for S = {q}, namely a targeted attack
of the central node. Because removal of q results in only
isolated nodes, |Cmax| = 1. Moreover, |S| = 1. Therefore,
τS(Star(n)) =
1
n−1 . By Lemma III.4, no other set can achieve
a lower VAT value, and so τ(Star(n)) = 1n−1 .
Proof of Theorem III.1: Let Sout denote the vertex
boundary of S that is outside of S, also called the outer vertex
boundary of S and precisely being Sout = {v ∈ V −S | ∃e =
{u, v} ∈ Cut(S, V − S)}. We may lower bound and upper
bound Sout as follows:
1) |Cut(S, V −S)| ≤ d|Sout| with equality occurring only
when all neighbors of nodes in Sout lie in S instead of
V − S
2) |Sout| ≤ |Cut(S, V − S)| with equality occurring only
when all outer neighbors of nodes in S are distinct
Combining Bound (2) above with the fact that |Cut(S,V−S)|d|S| =
Φ(G) ≤ 1d2 we have that
|Sout| ≤ |Cut(S, V − S)| ≤ |S|
d
Now, consider the structure of G upon the removal of nodes
Sout. As Sout ⊂ V − S, and removal of Sout also removes
edges along Cut(S, V − S), we know that at least S would
remain as a connected component. There are two possible sit-
uations: either (i) S would be the largest connected component
in which case |V −Sout−Cmax(V −Sout)| = |V −S−Sout|
or, (ii) S is not the largest connected component in which case
|V − Sout − Cmax(V − Sout)| ≥ |S|.
First consider case (i): By definition of Φ, S cannot contain
a strict majority of nodes of V , and therefore, |V − S| ≥ |S|
is known. Combining this with |Sout| ≤ |S| 1d implies that
|V − Sout −Cmax(V − Sout)| = |V − S − Sout| ≥ |S|d− 1
d
Further combining this with Bound (2) above, we have that
τSout =
|Sout|
|V−Sout−Cmax(V−Sout)|+1
≤ (d−1)|Cut(S,V−S)|d|S|+1
< (d− 1)Φ(G) < dΦ(G)
finishing the proof for case (i), because τ(G) ≤ τSout <
dΦ(G).
In the second case (ii), we also obtain that τSout ≤ dΦ(G):
Due to the previously established facts |Sout| ≤ |Cut(S, V −
S)| and |V − Sout − Cmax(V − Sout)| ≥ |S| we have
τSout =
|Sout|
|V−Sout−Cmax(V−Sout)|+1
< |Cut(S,V−S)||S|
= dΦ(G)
finishing the proof.
Proof of Lemma III.4: Because G is connected, at
least one node must be attacked in order to result in any
disconnection, so that the minimum achievable value of the
numerator of the τ function is 1. Considering the maximum
possible denominator of τ , namely the maximum achievable
|V − S − Cmax| + 1, we claim that it is n − 1. Because we
already argued that |S| ≥ 1, it suffices to show that Cmax 6= 0
for this situation, as n − 1 − 1 + 1 = n − 1 then yields the
desired lower bound. But, Cmax cannot be zero unless V = S
(or else some node would remain), and taking V = S gives a
VAT of 1 >> 1n−1 for n ≥ 3.
Proof of Lemma III.2: Let S = S(Φ(G)), and assume
that GS can be partitioned into two subgraphs that are dis-
connected from each other, namely G1 = (S1, E1) and G2 =
(S2, E2) such that S2 = S−S1 and E2 = ES−E1. Therefore,
the edge boundary or S is correspondingly partitioned such
that
|Cut(S, V − S)| = |Cut(S1, V − S)|+ |Cut(S2, V − S)|
For convenience, denote a = |Cut(S1, V − S)| =
|Cut(S1, V −S1)|, b = |Cut(S2, V −S)| = |Cut(S2, V −S2)|,
and c = |Cut(S, V − S)| = a + b, . Furthermore, denote
x = |S1|, y = |S2|, and z = |S| = x + y. Now, consider the
relative set conductances of S1 and S2, and without loss of
5generality, assume that ΦS1(G) ≤ ΦS2(G). Then, because the
normalization factor d is lost from both sides we have:
a
x
≤ b
y
But, due to the minimality of the conductance achieved by S,
we have
a+ b
x+ y
≤ a
x
≤ b
y
But, it is verifiable that for any positive integers a, b, x, y that
if ax <
b
y strictly, then
a
x
<
a+ b
x+ y
<
b
y
which would contradict the minimality of Φ(G) = ΦS(G).
Therefore, the previous inequality can only be satisfied when
a+ b
x+ y
=
a
x
=
b
y
And, in that case, S1 or S2 also achieve the conductance
of G. However, we did not assume that either of them are
connected. Nonetheless, it is clear that as long as one of them
is disconnected, the same argument as above can be applied
to get another partition into two smaller sets yet which each
achieve the conductance Φ. However, due to the finiteness of
G, this cannot continue ad infinitum, and there must exist a
set Si such that ΦG = ΦSi(G) and induced subgraph GSi is
connected.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF RESILIENCE
MEASURES
Here, we experimentally compare and discuss the resilience
measures of vertex attack tolerance, integrity[4], toughness[6],
tenacity[18] scattering number[15], and vertex expansion[17],
[11]. We have already established in the previous section that
conductance is not an appropriate measure of resilience in
the context of targeted node attacks. The specific graphs we
are comparing are shown in Fig. 1. They are (a) Star(10),
(b) HOTnet [10], (c) C3, a graph that breaks logically into 3
similar sized components [7], (d) barbell, a 3-regular graph on
10 nodes with an obvious bottleneck, (e) a PLOD graph on 25
nodes [21], (f) a 3-regular wheel on 10 nodes, and (g) a big
barbell consisting of two cliques connected by a single edge.
The exact experimental measurements of the resilience notions
for these graphs are presented in Table I. The HOTnet and
PLOD graphs are 25 nodes each. The star, barbell, and wheel
graphs are 10 nodes each. Furthermore, the barbell and wheel
graphs are also identical in the sizes of their edge sets, namely
both have 15 edges. The C3 graph has 33 nodes, whereas the
big barbell graph has 24 nodes.
It is certainly meaningful to compare graphs of similar sizes
to each other. As such, we will first consider the star, barbell,
and wheel graphs. We claim that a measure that accurately
captures resilience against targeted node attacks must clearly
distinguish the resiliences of these three graphs, and rank
their resilience in order of least resilient to most resilient as
(a) star (b) HOTNet
(c) C3 (d) barbell
(e) PLOD (f) wheel
(g) big barbell
Fig. 1. The graphs used in comparison.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF MEASURES ON 7 GRAPHS
Graph Type VAT I(G) t(G) T(G) h(g) V (G)
star .11 .20 .11 .22 .11 .40
barbell .20 .60 .50 1.75 .50 .40
Wheel 1.00 .60 1.00 1.2 1.00 1.60
HOTNet .06 .28 .14 .47 .09 .16
C3 .15 .36 .33 .81 .14 .29
big barbell .08 .54 .50 6.5 .50 .17
PLOD .25 .36 .33 .80 .17 .38
6follows: star, barbell, and wheel. We justify this as follows:
The star graph is the most vulnerable graph because removal
of a single node, which is a minimal size attack, creates
a maximally disconnected remaining graph of only isolated
nodes. In fact, star graphs of any size are the most vulnerable
graph of that size for the same reason. With regards to the
barbell graph, a single node attack (of either node adjacent to
the single edge bottleneck) disconnects the graph into exactly
half, which is a significant disconnection. In the context of
edge attacks, such a disconnection would be most significant
because each edge removal can disconnect at most one new
component. However, in the context of vertex attacks, it is
not as severe as a situation in which many small components
results. Nonetheless, amongst the set of attacks that results in
exactly two remaining components, the worst case situation
is for the components to be of similar sizes to each other (a
half-way split), as that situation maximizes the disconnected
pairs. And, such a case is exhibited by the barbell graph. As
for the wheel, it is a very well connected graph for its size.
In fact, any removal of up to three nodes is only useful for
disconnecting a single node from the remaining graph (a trivial
disconnection). In order to cause any non-trivial disconnection
in the wheel, at least four nodes must be attacked, and four is
already almost half of the size of the wheel itself. If attacking
half of the nodes of a graph is necessary to cause a serious
disruption, then that graph is very resilient. Therefore, we have
justified our resilience ranking of these three graphs.
Now note that VAT clearly respects this resilience ranking of
star, barbell, and wheel. In fact, it can be verified by the table
that all the measures considered respect this ranking, though
not strictly, except for tenacity, which ranks barbell as more
resilient than wheel. The other two problematic measures in
the context of this ranking are integrity, which ranks barbell
as equally resilient as wheel, and vertex expansion, which
ranks star as equally resilient as barbell. The problem with
integrity is that the number of vertex removals necessary to
cause a great disruption are not taken into account in any
proportional manner. The problem with vertex expansion on
the other hand is that the distribution of component sizes
remaining is not taken into account, so that the worst case
disruption always appears to correspond to a half-way split.
However, toughness and scattering number remain in tact as
those measures respecting the rankings proposed thus far.
Now let us more closely examine toughness t(G), scattering
number h(G), and VAT for the other graphs measured: All
three measures agree upon HOTnet as being the least resilient
of the remaining graphs. This is reasonable by viewing the
hierarchically star-like structure of the HOTnet illustrated, in
addition to the fact that it is a tree (and so only 1-connected
graph). VAT, toughness, and scattering also all agree upon
graph C3 as being the next least-resilient graph. However,
comparing the resilience of the PLOD graph with both barbell
and big barbell poses inconsistencies amongst the three mea-
sures: Both toughness and scattering rank both big barbell and
barbell as having significantly higher resilience than PLOD
(with both ranking barbell equally resilient as big barbell),
but VAT ranks PLOD as being more resilient than barbell,
which it ranks as more resilient than big barbell. Both barbell
and big barbell are graphs of severe bottlenecks in which the
removal of one or two nodes creates a half-way split in the
entire graph. It is clear that PLOD has no such bottlenecks in
the sense that there is no small subset of nodes whose removal
causes a half-way or even three-way split. However, PLOD
does appear to be composed of a well connected core subgraph
of the vast majority of nodes along with several tiny external
subgraphs attached around this core, which we may refer to
as the external hairs connected to follicles of the core graph.
Although there exists sets of follicle nodes whose removal
may disconnect proportionally as many hair subgraphs, each
new component that results is tiny in comparison to the core
subgraph, and indeed indeed proportionally many follicles
need to be attacked in order to disconnect them. Therefore,
we claim that PLOD should be considered more resilient than
the barbell and big barbell graphs as consistent with VAT, as
opposed to toughness and scattering. Furthermore, whereas
part of the problem in comparing these graphs is the size
difference (which may explain the slight difference in the VAT
measures as well), there is a more fundamental problem with
toughness and scattering in their lack of capturing a possible
bottleneck in a graph. Note that this is the opposite problem of
the vertex expansion (and conductance) measures, which failed
to capture any information on remaining component sizes. In
the context of all the measures considered herein, and given
all the graphs considered, we believe that VAT best captures
graph resilience with respect to targeted node attacks.
V. COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION OF VAT OF DIFFERENT
SCALE-FREE MODELS
Because exact calculation of vertex attack tolerance for
sufficiently large graphs proved to be intractable, we used a
combination of techniques to obtain either exact values or tight
upper bounds. A branch-and-bound technique was used on
small graphs to get exact values, and this proved infeasible for
graphs larger than 35 nodes. For larger graphs, we formulated
a genetic algorithm to obtain close approximations of the VAT
values. While the margin of error of the genetic algorithm
cannot be ascertained, the results are certainly valid upper
bounds of the actual VAT values. We will explain the genetic
algorithm used in more detail in the subsequent section both
because of some novelty in our method that might generalize
to optimize genetic algorithms to compute other resilience
measures, and also so that the reader can put our results
in perspective. The results obtained by running the genetic
algorithm on the preferential attachment based Barabasi-Albert
graphs (with m = 2 neighbors chosen for each entering
vertex) and the random scale-free graphs of the same degree
distribution are summarized in Table II. Precisely, the degree
distribution of the random scale-free graphs were generated
by the corresponding preferential attachment graph1. Because
1This is another reason why we omit the HOTnet, as we cannot guarantee
generating a HOTnet with an exactly pre-specified degree distribution.
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COMPARISON OF VAT OF BA AND RANDOM SF GRAPHS
n B-A Random
40 0.3000 0.33333
45 0.2692 0.30435
100 0.216667 0.26087
250 0.186813 0.25000
500 0.19171 0.28571
1000 0.193289 0.22222
2500 0.192679 0.22222
we are interested in how the topological generative properties
affects the resilience of different scale-free models, we felt
it is particularly important to control for degree distribution
as much as possible. Moreover, because a random graph of
any given degree distribution can be defined, it is appropriate
in this case to first generate the BA graph and then feed its
degree distribution into the random scale-free graph generator.
We note further that our random scale-free graph generator is
thus identical to the PLOD model [21] except for our explicit
input of the degree distribution.
It can be seen that the random scale-free graphs have
consistently better vertex attack tolerance than the Barabasi-
Albert graphs for the parameter m = 2. We also computed
VAT values for various HOTnets, and all appeared significantly
less resilient than the BA and random scale-free graphs of
corresponding size. We computed BA graphs with parameter
m = 1 as well and discovered that such BA graphs were
significantly non-resilient, with easily identifiable hubs whose
removal causes severe disruption, yielding very low VAT
values. We had difficulty in generating identical degree PLOD
graphs from BA graphs with m = 1 due to the preponderance
of degree one nodes. Additionally the generated PLOD graphs
tended not to be connected, so that the VAT value was
automatically meaningless. Therefore, we include the results
for the m = 2 BA graphs and their corresponding degree
PLOD counterparts only, noting that such graphs remain
relatively resilient despite doubling of graph sizes. However,
the corresponding PLOD graphs remain more resilient than
the BA graphs of identical degree distribution, provided they
are connected (which happens in likelihood given m = 2).
In addition to the actual computer VAT values in the table
II, one may view the worst-case disruptions caused by the
critical attack sets of the BA graph and the identically sized
and distributed PLOD graph of 1000 nodes respectively in
Figures 2 and 3. It can be seen that the worst case proportional
disruption to the PLOD graph only appears to remove a hair off
of a well-connected core whereas the worst-case proportional
disruption to the BA graph disconnects many components,
some of which are sizeable, at once.
VI. COMPUTATION OF VAT
As with many other resilience notions, calculating a global
minimum for VAT proves to be a challenging endeavor. As
V grows larger, the size of the search space for a set S,
|P (V ) |, minimizing vertex conductance grows exponentially.
(a) BA Attack
(b) BA CC Sizes
Fig. 2. BA attack visualization and resulting component size distributions.
Given this, exact computation over all S proves intractable for
V > 35. To overcome this, a genetic programming approach
was explored.
A. Genetic Algorithm
The genetic algorithm consists of the following steps: First,
a set of random chromosomes is generated. Each chromosome
cj consists of a set of |V | bits B. Let V = {1, 2, . . . , n}
be the usual ordering of nodes. The situation that Bi is 1
corresponds to considering Vi ∈ S, where S is the candidate
target set of vertex attack tolerance. Next, a fitness fj ∈ [0, 1]
is assigned to each chromosome, corresponding to 1−τci(G).
Note that because vertex attack tolerance is normalized, fj is
also normalized. After fitness computation, a new population
of chromosomes is generated: Two mates are selected using
tournament selection, favoring individuals with higher fitness.
A crossover operation is performed with some probability
to generate 2 new chromosomes. Each new chromosome
undergoes a mutation step, wherein each bit is flipped with
8(a) PLOD Attack
(b) PLOD CC Sizes
Fig. 3. PLOD attack visualization and resulting component size distributions.
some non-zero probability. The fitness is then evaluated for
the new population and the cycle continues.
While this technique is more feasible for large graph sizes,
two observations are noted. First, the high rate of memory
access bottlenecks GPU based parallelization. Secondly, ben-
eficial mutations are seemingly rare and produce a sub-optimal
population.
B. Hill-Climbing
With these insights, a hill-climbing approached was tried
to enhance the genetic algorithm. One initial chromosome is
generated using a randomized contraction based min-cut algo-
rithm [16], guaranteeing a cut. To transform this edge set into a
node set S, one endpoint is selected at random from each edge
and added to the node set. This guarantees that V −S will be
disconnected. A mutation vector M of length j is created with
m1 < m2 < · · · < mj ≤ |V | initialized to < 1, 2, . . . , j >. A
mutated chromosome with Hamming distance j is generated
by flipping bits m1,m2, . . . ,mj . The fitness is then evaluated.
If the new chromosome is more fit, then M is reset and the
new chromosome is kept; otherwise, mj is incremented using
ripple carry to deal with mj = |V |+1. This technique attempts
all possible mutations of length j then increments j when no
progress is made. To optimize progress, mutation length j < 3
is used and many vertex cuts are tried.
While the genetic algorithm performed relatively well, ben-
eficial mutations become increasingly improbable. This newer
non-probabalistic method is able to improve chromosomes
signifigantly beyond the point they stagnate in the genetic
algorithm. After 200,000 generations with population size 64,
BA with 100 verticies stagnated. Hill-climbing decreased this
an additional 10 percent in minutes. Not only does it acheive
better bounds on VAT, but it does so orders of magnitude faster
than the parallelized GA.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONTINUING WORK
We have motivated a measure of resilience for networks
in the context of targeted node attacks, which we termed
vertex attack tolerance or VAT, compared our measure against
existing measures, and compared the VAT of preferential
attachment and random scale-free graphs. Our theoretical
results indicate that VAT behaves similarly to conductance
in the case of d-regular graphs, but captures node-based
resilience in a way that conductance cannot in the case of
heterogeneous degree graphs. Our comparison of VAT with
the other resilience measures indicates that VAT is the only
measure that fully captures both the major bottlenecks of a
network and the resulting component size distribution upon
targeted node attacks.
With regards to the comparative node-based resilience of
different scale-free models, the preferential attachment model
(B-A model) and the random scale-free model in particular,
our results indicate that the random scale-free networks are
consistently more resilient against targeted node attacks than
the preferential attachment networks of the exact same degree
distribution. However, somewhat surprisingly, both network
types appear relatively resilient compared to their sizes: Even
as the network continues to double the VAT values decrease
very slowly. We also noted that the HOTnets appear sig-
nificantly less resilient than both BA and random scale-free
graphs. In evaluation of our results, there is the caveat that
results were obtained via a mixed genetic and hill-climbing
algorithmic approach so that we cannot guarantee the accuracy
of the measures. However, we allowed the algorithm to run for
a minimum of 100,000 generations of size 64 taking 1-8 hours,
particularly for large graphs. Furthermore, hill-climbing up to
a mutation length of 2 was performed on both the previous GA
results and a minimum of 1,000 random vertex cuts. Therefore,
the accuracy of the results have been enhanced as much as
possible.
Nonetheless, in the course of our computations, we dis-
covered that with parameter m = 2 finding a bad vertex set
S ⊂ V whose removal causes notably greater disruption in the
network compared to other vertex sets became significantly
more difficult, especially for the BA type graphs. In terms
of VAT, we are referring to sets S whose behavior is similar
9to the set S(τ(G)). Much previous work discusses “hubs” of
such networks, easily identifiable by the highest degree nodes,
which are purported major points of vulnerability. We found
that while such hubs are absolutely critical for BA graphs of
parameter m = 1, and they are also important for BA graphs
with m = 2, looking only at the hubs is insufficient to find
the critical attack sets for BA graphs of m = 2. On the other
hand, once the critical attack set is discovered for any of the
BA type graphs, indeed the level of disruption caused is more
significant compared to the worst case disruption of the PLOD
graph of corresponding degree. Nonetheless, finding the non-
hub nodes in the most critical attack set of the BA graphs
of m = 2 was very difficult and time consuming, and most
attack sets caused little to no harm for such graphs. While
this further validates the tolerance of such graphs against
random vertex attacks, it also invokes the following question:
Given the difficulty of discovering the worst case set of nodes
with respect to VAT, under what reasonable computational and
information-theoretic assumptions can an attacker discover
such a set of nodes for a given scale-free graph model?
We continue to work on defining, bounding, and computing
vertex attack tolerance with respect to an attack model F
for various network types. For example, the simplest case of
a random attack model R yields τR(G) = E[τS(G)], the
expected value of VAT over all subsets of vertices. Other
important attack models naturally include those preferring the
highest degree nodes as well as those preferring the highest
betweenness nodes. One problem with a model based on
betweenness and other centrality notions, however, is that they
are not in general a locally computable quantity, but rather
requires global information about the network. In future work,
we consider the power of an attacker or set of attackers with
respect to VAT, when their informational and computational
resources are reasonably limited.
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